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COMPENSATION AND COMMENSURABILITY
MARGARET JANE RADINt
INTRODUCTION
When someone who has lost an arm in an accident receives
$100,000 in compensation through the tort system, what does this
transaction mean? Does it mean that an arm is "worth" $100,000?
In this Essay I want to explore the disputed "equation" between
bodily integrity and money. I am writing about meaning-the way
human interactions are understood by a community sharing a
concept in practice. The concept in practice I focus on is compen-
sation, in particular compensation for personal injury. Of course,
compensation remedies are pervasive in law, so the investigation I
offer here is just a first look at a piece of the picture.
I will suggest that our legal practice reflects conflict in how
compensation for personal injury is understood-that compensation
is a contested concept. A commodified conception of compensa-
tion, in which harm to persons can be equated with a dollar value,
coexists with a noncommodified conception, in which harm cannot
be equated with dollars. In the commodified conception, harm and
dollars are commensurable, and in the noncommodified concep-
tion, they are incommensurable. After describing the significance
of commensurability as a philosophical issue, I will go on to sug-
gest that once we understand the relationship of commensurability
to the issue of what compensation means, we will be in a better
position to understand the contemporary debate about whether the
tort system should compensate for "nonpecuniary" harms.
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Moreover, understanding the relevance of commensurability to
this debate about compensation should shed light on the general
problem of how to conceive of corrective justice. If we do not
accept a commodified conception of compensation, in which harms
and money are commensurable, then payment of money cannot
restore persons to the status quo ante, and corrective justice will
be impossible if that is what we demand of it. In this Essay I
draw attention to an alternative conception of corrective justice. In
this alternative conception, compensation is understood not as a
commensurable quid pro quo for harm, but rather as a form of re-
dress: affirming public respect for the existence of rights and pub-
lic recognition of the transgressor's fault with regard to
disrespecting rights.
To begin, I distinguish between "commodified" and
"noncommodified" conceptions of compensation, and explain how
these different understandings of compensation relate to different
views of the purpose of tort recovery: deterrence and corrective
justice.
I. Two KINDS OF VIEWS ABOUT COMPENSATION
A. Commodified Conceptions
By market rhetoric, which I sometimes call the discourse of
commodification, I mean conceiving of everything people value as
if it were a commodity subject to market exchange. (When Judge
Richard Posner says that children are the "household commodity
that places the greatest demands on the wife's time,"1 he is using
market rhetoric.) The proponents of law and economics conceive
of tort law in market rhetoric. Tort law is an engine for accom-
plishing economic efficiency by maximizing the amount of dollar
value in the world, given some set of entitlements as a starting
point. A deterrence rationale most comfortably inhabits this mar-
ket model. It tells us to perform a cost-benefit analysis: We should
pay out damages as long as the cost to society of paying them will
deter possible tortfeasors from imposing greater accident costs in
the future.
1. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 141 (4th ed. 1992); see also
GARY BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981) (using market rhetoric and method-
ology to analyze marriage, births, divorce, division of labor in households, prestige, sex,
love, and all aspects of family structure and experience).
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In a pure deterrence model, can we even conceive of damages
as "compensatory?" Perhaps not. If there is a core understanding
in which "compensatory" denotes some direct relationship between
the damages paid and the victim's loss and its magnitude, then, at
least prima facie, damages are not "compensatory" in the pure
deterrence model. Someone might object that I ought not to begin
an essay on compensation with a conceptual regime whose "com-
pensatory" character can be questioned. Yet the deterrence model,
at least when couched in market rhetoric, does equate the dollar
value of damages with the dollar value of harm. This is the equa-
tion I want to explore, and I think I can usefully let the question
whether deterrence-based damages are compensatory hang fire
while I try to explain the way that compensation is a contested
concept.
In the deterrence model, the equation comes about as follows.
An economically rational tortfeasor would choose to implement
safety measures that would prevent an accident if these measures
cost it less than paying damages, and would choose to let an acci-
dent happen if the safety measures to prevent it would cost more
than paying the damages. Society controls the level of safety mea-
sures, and thus the amount of harm from accidents, by the level at
which it sets damages. The optimal level of safety measures for
society, according to the model, is the level at which any further
expenditures for safety would be more expensive than the "costs"
of the harms that will occur without them. Thus, in this model,
the harm to victims must be a known dollar value in order to set
the proper amount of damages. Even if the reason the tortfeasor
must pay is to achieve deterrence rather than to "compensate" the
victim for her loss, in this model there is an equation between the
value of harm and the value of damages.2
This view of damages conceives of harm to victims in market
rhetoric. Injuries to life and health are "costs," just as the dollars
expended for safety measures, against which they are balanced,
2. In a pure deterrence model, it is a further question whether the damages should
be paid to the victim. In favor of doing so one can postulate "demoralization" costs that
would otherwise accrue, but against doing so one can postulate that more efficient uses
can be found for the money. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A
LEGAL AND ECONoMIC ANALYSIS 88-94 (1970); PETER CANE, TORT LAW AND ECO.
NOMIC INTERESTS 492-93 (1991); A. MITcHELL POLINsKY & YEON-KOO CHE,
DECOUPLING LIABILITY: OPTIMAL INCENTIVES FOR CARE AND LITIGATION (National
Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 3634, 1991).
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are "costs." I call this a commodified conception because it con-
ceives of the harm to the injured victim as commensurable with
money, as if the victim's interest in being free of injury were the
same as money or a fungible commodity she possessed.3
In this commodified conception, theoretically the harm is
simply a cost to the victim. In market rhetoric, if I lose my arm or
my car keys, either way it is simply a cost, although one cost may
be greater than the other. To those of us who do not conceive of
everything in terms of the market, market rhetoric is a form of
reductionism. It "reduces" to the language of market value some-
thing that is appropriately conceptualized in some other language
of value.
Many who are sympathetic to economic reasoning do not
adopt this pure deterrence model. Instead, at least implicitly, they
adopt a mixed view in which deterrence is consequentially impor-
tant because it creates incentives for efficient activities and uses of
resources, but rights like bodily integrity also are recognized. In
the mixed view, rights are set by natural law, or by a rule-utilitari-
an precommitment procedure, or are simply presupposed, but in
any event are set by other than the same consequentialist concerns
that animate deterrence.
Those who accept this kind of mixed economic view need not
be troubled by the question I left hanging. Even if we think a
core requirement of compensation is that payment bear a direct
relationship to the individual victim's harm (so that in a pure
deterrence model damages are not compensatory), the mixed eco-
nomic view leaves room for a quid pro quo conception of com-
pensation that squarely meets the requirement. In a quid pro quo
conception of compensation, payment is in return for rights that
are violated. Compensation restores the dollar equivalent of
wrongfully divested entitlements to their rightful holders. Compen-
sation makes the victim completely whole; that is its theoretical
aim, at least. In market rhetoric, the victim is conceived to be
indifferent between being harmed and getting the payment, and
not being harmed at all. When the cost in dollars of the injury is
paid, the victim is made whole.
The clearest form of a commodified conception of compensa-
tion appears in this mixed view, because the model treats injury
3. I will say more about commensurability below in Part II.
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and payment of damages exactly like the sale of a commodity the
victim owns. I will refer to this as the core commodified concep-
tion. In a "transaction" between the injurer and the victim, the
victim "trades" her bodily integrity for a suitable payment of mon-
ey. In the economic pure deterrence model, the person's interest
in bodily integrity is valued in dollars, as if it were a commodity
the person owned; in the mixed view, in addition, the reason the
tortfeasor must pay is to provide an equivalent in dollars to "com-
pensate" for the divested commodity.
B. Noncommodified Conceptions
There is no canonical conception of corrective justice. In a
rough understanding that I find useful, corrective justice means to
make required changes in an unjustified state of affairs between
an injurer and a victim, when the injurer's activity has caused the
injustice, so that such changes bring about a just state of affairs
between them, and one that is related in a morally appropriate
way to the status quo ante. A shorthand way of saying this is that
corrective justice restores moral balance between the parties. From
this perspective, tort law is an engine for bringing about corrective
justice by requiring tortfeasors to make recompense to their vic-
tims. This view of tort law is not couched in market rhetoric. Its
core concepts are rights and wrongs, not dollars and exchange.
Sometimes it appears that corrective justice can be accom-
plished by simply unwinding a wrongful interaction, restoring the
parties to the status quo ante. Stolen money can be given back;
goods obtained by fraud can be returned to the owner. Lawyers
call this restitution. Some philosophers refer to rectification rather
than restitution, and hold that rectification is what corrective jus-
tice requires Rectification means restoring the status quo ante or
a state of affairs equivalent in moral value to the status quo ante.
Thus, even when restitution of money or goods can be made, it
may not amount to rectification. Rectification may be incomplete
without attention to other injuries brought about by the wrong,
such as loss of use value, loss of opportunity to sell at a profit, or
emotional distress.
4. See LOREN E. LOMASKY, PERSONS, RIGHTS, AND THE MORAL COMMUNITY
142-44 (1987).
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In most personal injury cases, rectification in the form of
restitution is not possible, and compensation is used instead. Here
the question arises whether compensation and rectification may be
treated as equivalent. Can compensation serve as rectification? For
the core commodified conception of compensation, the answer is
yes. In that conception, the victim is by definition indifferent be-
tween having been injured-and having the money, on the one
hand, and not having been injured but not having the money, on
the other. The state of affairs after injury and compensation (hav-
ing been injured and having the money) is identical with, or at
least the moral equivalent of, the status quo ante (not having been
injured but not having the money). But in other conceptions of
compensation the answer is less clear that compensation can be
rectification, or indeed clear that it cannot.
A noncommodified conception of compensation most comfort-
ably inhabits a noncommodified view of torts in general, a view in
which the central concepts are right and wrong, not "costs." In
such a view, compensation does not imply commensurability be-
tween the harm and the payment; injuries and dollars are not
ranked on a single scale of value. What else can compensation
mean?
I want to call to mind the following possibility, which I think
is the core noncommodified conception of compensation. Requir-
ing payment is a way both to bring the wrongdoer to recognize
that she has done wrong and to make redress to. the victim. Re-
dress is not restitution or rectification. Redress instead means
showing the victim that her rights are taken seriously. It is accom-
plished by affirming that some action is required to symbolize
public respect for the existence of certain rights and public recog-
nition of the transgressor's fault in disrespecting those rights. In
this conception of compensation, neither the harm to the victim
nor the victim's right not to be harmed are commensurate with
money. They are not conceptually equated with fungible commodi-
ties.
Many social democrats view the tort system not as an engine
for delivering corrective justice, but rather as one aspect of a
social insurance regime.' A different noncommodified conception
of compensation can be part of such a view. In a social insurance
5. See, e.g., STEPHEN D. SUGARMAN, DOING AWAY WITH PERSONAL INJURY LAW:
NEW COMPENSATION MECHANISMS FOR VICTIMS, CONSUMERS, AND BUSINESS (1989).
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regime, society makes payments to those in need for various rea-
sons, including social disadvantage regardless of cause, and emo-
tional, mental, or physical disabilities, whether congenital or
caused by illness- or accident. In such a scheme, payments to
accident victims are not compensatory in the two core senses I
have'described. They are not paid out to make the victim whole
(core commodified conception) or to give the victim redress
against someone whose activities have wronged her (core
noncommodified conception). Payments may be compensatory in
another sense, however, in that they are supposed to give the
victim some needed wherewithal to lead a satisfactory life, thereby
making up for-compensating for-the capabilities or advantages
the victim lacks. This is a noncommodified conception because it
does not suggest that the money payment is taken in trade for the
harm, or equivalent to the harm in exchange value.
To summarize: Compensation seems to be a contested con-
cept. There is a core commodified conception, in which payment
for an injury is like buying a commodity, and a less central com-
modified conception, in which harms are "costs" to be measured
against the costs of avoiding them. There is also a core noncom-
modified conception, in which payment provides redress but not
restitution or rectification, and a less central noncommodified
conception, in which payment makes up for certain social disad-
vantages. In Part III, I will explore how these different concep-
tions are implicated in the debate about compensatiofi for pain
and suffering. First, I turn to the notion of incommensurability.
II. INCOMMENSURABILITY AND THE ISSUE OF COMPENSATION
A. Contra Utilitarianism
Philosophers have puzzled over a problem named "incommen-
surability" in various contexts. In each of them, the problem is
whether incommensurability &xists. Although it goes by the same
name, I am not sure to what extent incommensurability is usefully
regarded as the same problem in all contexts. One context is a
debate over relativism.7 If a commitment to the existence of
6. One leading example is New Zealand's comprehensive social insurance scheme.
See Accident Compensation Act, No. 181 (1982) (N.Z.); GEOFFREY W.R. PALMER, COM-
PENSATION FOR INCAPACITY: A STUDY OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN NEW ZEA-
LAND AND AUSTRALIA (1979).
7. For the parameters of this debate, see, for example, the essays collected in REL-
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incommensurability signifies a commitment to radical untranslat-
ability between different cultural groups or different historical
periods, then this commitment may support relativism. If the lan-
guage, conventions, and forms of life of one group cannot be
made at all intelligible in terms of the language, conventions, and
forms of life of another, then it is thought that there is nothing to
be said about which practices are better: they are incommensura-
ble.
Another context, which appears to be subsumed by the broad-
er debate about relativism, is a debate about Kuhnian paradigms
in the philosophy of science. Kuhn argued that successive para-
digms are incommensurable, inhabiting different world views, such
that statements in one cannot be translated into statements in the
other.' He thought it "illusive in principle" to suppose that suc-
cessive paradigms are coming closer and closer to some fixed
reality existing independent of any paradigm.' When his critics
taxed him with relativism, he denied it by saying that paradigms
could be judged better or worse by their success at puzzle-solving;
he argued that it was characteristic of later paradigms to be better
at puzzle-solving.'"
Donald Davidson argued forcefully against the possibility of
incommensurability, understood as radical untranslatability between
cultural groups or historical periods." Hilary Putnam did the
same for the Kuhnian subcategory.12 I cannot do-justice here to
these elegant and complex arguments, but their core is simple:
The notion that we would be able to know such incommen-
surability when we saw it, much less proceed to talk about it, is
conceptually incoherent.' If we cannot make intelligible anything
ATIVISM: INTERPRETATION AND CONFRONTATION (Michael Krausz ed., 1989) and RELA-
TIVISM: COGNITIVE AND MORAL (Michael Krausz & Jack W. Meiland eds., 1982).
8. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 148-50 (2d
rev. ed. 1970).
9. Id. at 206.
10. Id. In my view, Kuhn's rejoinder just pushes the question back a stage. For
some time our paradigms have been subsumed by a larger one in which puzzle-solving is
what science is for, but what if some other group has an entirely different view of the
point of science?
11. See DONALD DAvIDsON, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in INQUI-
RIES INro TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 183 (1984).
12. See HILARY PUTNAM, REASON, TRUTH AND HIsTORY 113-26 (1981).
13. Because of these arguments, radical untranslatability is not a promising definition
of incommensurability. But untranslatability may be a matter of degree, and a milder
understanding of untranslatability may shed more light on incommensurability; and may
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that some other group of human beings does, we would have no
basis for identifying them as human beings in the first place.
Another context in which an argument about incommen-
surability comes up is debates in ethics about whether values can
be summed. This is the kind of incommensurability I think rele-
vant to the questions I am exploring here. 14 This notion of
incommensurability is a broad strategy for attacking utilitarian-
ismY5
It appears that a utilitarian injunction to maximize the sum of
values implies either a reductionist or a scalar claim, or both. The
reductionist claim is that there is one "stuff" of value to which all
other values can be reduced, and this "stuff" is what we sum
when we maximize. The scalar claim is that all values and packag-
es of values can be arrayed in order from least valuable to most
valuable on a continuous curve, so that we can maximize value by
picking the highest package on the curve.
In arguments about ethics, the notion of incommensurability is
meant to deny one or both of these claims. If incommensurability
is put forward to deny the reductionist claim, then the claim that
values are incommensurable means that there is no "stuff" that we
can substitute equivalent amounts of when we try to sum values.
If incommensurability is put forward to deny the scalar claim, then
make relativism attractive for some.
14. There is as yet little writing on incommensurability by legal scholars, because we
have just begun to notice that the debates in the philosophical literature might be impor-
tant for law. See Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at Democ-
racy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
2121, 2145-66 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92
MICH. L. REV. (forthcoming 1994); Richard Warner, Incommensurability as a Jurispruden.
tial Puzzle, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 147 (1992).
15. Martha Nussbaum makes clear that the incommensurability debate in ethics is
much older than controversies over utilitarianism. According to Nussbaum, Plato argued
for "an ethical 'science of measurement,' at the heart of which is the belief in
commensurability." MARTHA NUSSBAUM, Plato on Commensurability and Desire, in
LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE 106 (1992).
One of Nussbaum's purposes in retrieving this Platonic argument is to comment on
the present:
To pursue Plato's arguments ... will remind us that certain proposals in ethics
and especially in economic theory that present themselves as innocuous exten-
sions of ordinary belief and practice could actually lead, followed and lived with
severity and rigor, to the end of human life as we currently know it.
Id. at 107.
I have pursued a kindred path in worrying about the effect on human flourishing
of conceiving of everything that people value in market rhetoric. See Margaret Jane
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1877-87 (1987).
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the claim that values are incommensurable means that there is no
scale along which all values can be arrayed so that for any value
or package of values we can say definitively that it has more or
less value than some other.
Either of these claims can be made partial. It.need not be the
case that either all values are reducible or scalable, or none are.
A utilitarian may claim that many values reduce to some "stuff,"
even if not all of them do; an opponent may claim that a few
values may reduce to some "stuff," but most of them do not. A
utilitarian may claim that many values can be arrayed on a scale,
or on a number of scales, even if pockets of incommensurabilities
exist; an opponent may claim that some values can be arrayed on
a scale or scales, but that there are large or significant areas of
incommensurability.
This last debate, about the extent or significance of incom-
mensurability, seems to come down to deeply held conflicting
intuitions that have so far proved difficult to capture in theory.
Some writers, for example James Griffin,16 find that incommen-
surability is not an important problem. Others, for example Joseph
Raz, 7 find that it is. Much of their disagreement seems to me
related to different intuitions about how to characterize certain
kinds of commonplace actions and interactions. In particular, how
do we interpret an actor's choices? May we infer commensurability
to the extent the actor actually does choose one value over the
other? (Should choices between values be read as "trade-offs" in
the same way we read commercial exchanges?)
In an example patterned on one of Raz's, suppose that a man
is faced with the choice of whether to take a job in a distant city.
The job pays $100,000 more than his present job, but if he takes
it, he will forego the company of his spouse. 8 If he takes the
job, are we entitled to infer that he values the company of his
spouse less than he values $100,000? To make this inference one
must be committed to commensurability. The inference assumes
the two values can be placed on the same scale, from which we
16. See JAMES GRIFFIN, WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT AND MORAL
IMPORTANCE 75-92 (1986) [hereinafter GRIFFIN, VELL-BEING]; James Griffin, Are There
Incommensurable Values?, 7 PHIL & PUB. AFF. 39 passim (1977).
17. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 321-66 (1986) [hereinafter RAz,
MORALITY]; Joseph Raz, Value Incommensurability: Some Preliminaries, 86 PROC. ARIS-
TOTELIAN SOC'Y 117 passim (1985-86) [hereinafter Raz, Value Incommensurability].
18. RAz, MORALITY, supra note 17, at 345-53.
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can read off that one option is more valuable than the other.
Spousal companionship is "traded off" for dollars. Those who
make the inference find the language of revealed preference appo-
site. By making the "trade-off" of his spouse's company in return
for $100,000, the man "reveals" that the dollar value he places on
his spouse's company is less than $100,000.
Writers like Griffin think the inference of commensurability is
obviously correct 1 ---if we see people making choices among
things they value, there must be a scale on which those values can
be arrayed. But writers like Raz think the inference is an obvious
non sequitur2-from the fact of choice, nothing about the
commensurability of values can be inferred. The nature of an
action-its meaning-is simply the conventional understanding of
it, and people in our culture do not conceive of these kinds of
choices as trades.
I have tried out these conflicting understandings of what such
choices mean on law students. Many think choices like this "must"
imply commensurability, and an inference about revealed prefer-
ence seems obviously right; but many think the fact of choice
implies nothing at all about commensurability, and that no infer-
ence about trade-off is warranted. So far I have not found argu-
ments that change people's minds about this; they seem to be
deeply committed either to values being orderly in this way or to
their not being so. My own intuitions are with Raz. Someone who
says there "must" be a scale "behind" or "underlying" people's
choices is like one of Wittgenstein's interlocutors who says there
"must" be something common to all games.21 There is no "must"
about it-unless a socially shared understanding of these choices
includes such a "must." The meaning of choices is how they are
socially understood. There is no mysterious something that "under-
lies" such conventions of language and practice.
The fact that people's intuitions are stubbornly diverse about
how to interpret actions that could be read as trades carries
19. GRIFMN, WELL-BEING, supra note 16; see also Gerald F. Gaus, Does Compensa.
tion Restore Equality?, in COMPENSATORY JUSTIcE: NOMOS XXXIII 45, 63-67 (John W.
Chapman ed., 1991) (arguing that compensation can result in a return to economic, if not
moral, equality).
20. Raz, Value Incommensurability, supra note 17, at 128-34; see also Sunstein, supra
note 14 (manuscript at 1, on file with author).
21. LUDWIG WTrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 31e-32e (G.E.M.
Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 1958).
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through, I think, to a conflicted understanding of compensation.
That is, these stubbornly diverse intuitive interpretations are deep-
ly connected with the fact that compensation is a contested con-
cept. To this connection I now turn.
B. Compensation
How is the debate about value commensurability connected
with the issue of compensation? At least at the theoretical level, if
we think there are widespread areas of commensurability, we can
be more confident that compensation, if calibrated correctly, can
amount to rectification. If the fact that we see people making
choices between a sum of money and someone's company means
that money and company are ranked on a scale, then it should be
possible to rank money and having one's limbs intact, money and
having one's parent alive, or money and having the companionship
of one's child. All we need for rectification in such a case to is to
pay the amount of money that is barely enough for the person to
have chosen the money over the other thing she values. It may be
true that in some cases no amount of money would satisfy this
condition. There may be pockets of incommensurability. But those
whose intuitions run to inferring that many of our values can be
scaled think that such cases are rare.
Both the reductionist and the scalar claims of commen-
surability can give rise to what I have called commodified concep-
tions of compensation. In the simplest case, the reductionist claim
is put in monetary terms. That is, if it is claimed that there is
some "stuff" in terms of which all other values can be expressed,
and furthermore that the "stuff" is money, then all values reduce
to commodities, and compensation amounts to payment for the
sale of one's commodity. The scalar claim also yields a
commodified conception of compensation. If each thing someone
values can be ranked as either better or worse than a sum of
money, then, even if values do not reduce to money, there is in
principle a sum of money that will provide rectification. In that
case, it still appears that verlues are commodities that can be sold.
What about reductionism not involving money? Some utilitari-
ans might claim that values are all reducible to one kind of
"stuff"-utils, as time-honored convention would have it-but that
utils cannot be made equivalent to money, perhaps because utils
are wholly subjective. Clearly then, interpersonal utility comparison
DUKE LA W JO URNA L
becomes problematic,' and it might seem that this is a less clear
case of commodification. Yet as long as utils can be scaled in
theory, which seems to be implied in the claim that they are one
kind of "stuff," this case is the same as the one involving the
scalar assumption by itself.
C. Corrective Justice
Many utilitarians have the stubborn intuition I described
above to the effect that most values can be scaled. Perhaps that is
what makes them utilitarians. Many economists have the same
stubborn intuition, with the further unquestioned assumption that
all values reduce to money. From this point of view, compensation
is unproblematic, at least in theory, even if we believe that in
order to satisfy the demands of corrective justice, compensation
must amount to rectification. In practice, as I noted earlier, deter-
rence, rather than corrective justice, often fits better with
economic views, so the question of rectification may not often
come up for such theorists. Nevertheless, economists often have
mixed views as I described, believing that some rights exist other
than for consequentialist reasons. In such a view we are likely to
find a version of corrective justice, conceived of as restoring
wrongly divested entitlements or their equivalents to their rightful
holders. Compensation can substitute for the restoration of the
entitlement in such a mixed economic view.
Compensation poses a problem for those whose intuitions
about commensurability run the other way. If corrective justice
requires rectification, and if injury cannot be translated into mon-
ey, how can payment of money ever amount to rectification, so as
to satisfy the demands of corrective justice? The problem, an
important one, has been too little noticed, perhaps because the
connection between compensation and commensurability has been
too little noticed. In my view, the problem will have to be dis-
solved rather than solved. That is, I think it most likely that the
problem incommensurability poses for rectification as corrective
justice will only be solved by developing an understanding of
corrective justice that does not require rectification.
22. I do not mean to imply that interpersonal utility comparison is not problematic if
utils do reduce to money. For one thing, people may obtain extra utils by lying about
how much they value something, and this would make comparison difficult.
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In other words, there must be some other way to restore
moral balance between the parties than by putting the parties into
the status quo ante, which may be irretrievable, or by putting
them into a state equivalent in value to the status quo ante, which
may be unachievable given the fact of incommensurability. As my
earlier description of a core noncommodified conception of com-
pensation reveals, I suggest that compensation can symbolize pub-
lic respect for rights and public recognition of the transgressor's
fault by requiring something important to be given up on one side
and received on the other, even if there is no equivalence of value
possible. Although I cannot now take on the task of trying to
outline an appropriate theory of corrective justice, perhaps such a
theory will conclude that this kind of redress is what corrective
justice demands. At any rate, it is well to note the importance of
incommensurability for the general theory of corrective justice.
III. COMPENSATION IN PRACTICE: THE PAIN
AND SUFFERING DEBATE
A. The Traditional View
In-tort law there is a debate in progress about whether com-
pensation should be available for "non-economic" or "nonpecuni-
ary" harms like pain and suffering or intense emotional distress.
For these harms, the traditional common law position adheres by
and large to a noncommodified conception of compensation.
The Second Restatement of Torts draws a clear distinction
between harm to "pecuniary interests" and "bodily harm or emo-
tional distress."'  For pecuniary interests, "compensatory damages
are designed to place [the person] in a position substantially
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1979). In fact, the line between pecu-
niary and nonpecuniary harms is fuzzy. For example, loss of a wife's consortium was
historically thought of as an economic harm to her husband, because the law focused on
the services she owed him; but in a modem understanding, the emotional component of
the loss is more important. See, ag., Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 302 N.E.2d 555 (Mass.
1973). Moreover, if a goal of economic damages is to make the victim functional again
as a worker, it becomes difficult to separate which items are necessary for functioning
and which items are instead directed more toward emotional satisfaction; psychotherapy
or going back to school to learn something new can be both. In this Essay I ignore the
difficulty of drawing the line between pecuniary and nonpecuniary harms, as well as what
we can learn from this difficulty, and focus instead on the arguments for and against
compensation for harms that are determined to be nonpecuniary, however that determina-
tion is made.
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equivalent in a pecuniary way to that which he would have occu-
pied had no tort been committed."'2 That is, for pecuniary inter-
ests compensation is rectification. For other interests, however,
compensation means something else. The Restatement goes on to
say,
When however, the tort causes bodily harm or emotional distress,
the law cannot restore the injured person to his previous posi-
tion. The sensations caused by harm to the body or by pain or
humiliation are not in any way analogous to a pecuniary loss,
and a sum of money is not the equivalent of peace of mind.
Nevertheless, damages given for pain and humiliation are called
compensatory. They give to the injured person some pecuniary
return for what he has suffered or is likely to suffer. There is no
scale by which the detriment caused by suffering can be mea-
sured and hence there can be only a very rough correspondence
between the amount awarded as damages and the extent of the
suffering.'s
Thus, the traditional legal position on pain and suffering seems
committed to incommensurability. Rectification is not possible
("the law cannot restore the injured person to his previous posi-
tion," nor to its equivalent), because the value to the victim of
freedom from pain and suffering cannot be reduced to money (the
harm is "not in any way analogous" to a loss of money, and the
desirable state, "peace of mind," is "not the equivalent" of a sum
of money), nor can amounts of suffering be arrayed on a scale
("there is no scale") so that they might be paired in parallel with
amounts on the money scale.
What then does compensation mean, if it cannot be rectifica-
tion? About this, the Restatement and the legal discourse it crystal-
lizes supply little, and what they do supply seems to lean ambiv-
alently back toward commensurability. The victim receives "some
pecuniary return for what he has suffered;" the dollars awarded in
damages do have a "very rough correspondence" to the extent of
the harm. If the pecuniary return is "for" the suffering, if indeed it
is a "return," the process can be understood in market rhetoric;
suffering is an investment in exchange for which a return is re-
ceived. If there is a "correspondence" between amounts of dollars
and amounts of suffering, however "rough," suffering can be un-
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a (1979).
25. Id.
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derstood as scalable in the way that money is, and the earlier
denial of commensurability ("there is no scale") is undercut.
I think it is fair to say that the Restatement is accurate in
conveying the traditional commitment to incommensurability, both
in its ambivalence and in its inarticulateness about what compensa-
tion means when it does not mean rectification. Some courts say
the purpose of compensation for pain and suffering is to come as
close as possible to rectification, even while admitting that there is
no way we could know what coming close would mean. The fol-
lowing is typical:
An economic loss can be compensated in kind by an economic
gain; but recovery for non-economic losses such as pain and
suffering and loss of enjoyment of life rests on "the legal fiction
that money damages can compensate for a victim's injury." We
accept this fiction, knowing that although money will neither ease
the pain nor restore the victim's abilities, this device is as close
as the law can come in its effort to right the wrong. We have no
hope of evaluating what has been lost, but a monetary award
may provide a meagure of solace for the condition created.26
This passage makes very clear the conflict in the traditional under-
standing of compensation. We are to come close to something
amounting to rectification (aiming to ease the pain and restore the
victim's abilities), while at the same time recognizing that we have
no hope of evaluating what it is we are to come close to. This
conflict may codify the conflicting intuitions about commen-
surability existing in our legal culture. One possible reason that
legal discourse remains ambiguous, then, is that it reflects a con-
flict between different conceptions of compensation caused by
different degrees of commitment to incommensurability. Another
possible reason legal discourse has remained ambiguous or inartic-
ulate about what compensation in such cases is for, and has kept
making rhetorical gestures like "coming close" to rectification, may
be an effort to avoid implying a punitive meaning for compen-
sation. One thing that compensation is not supposed to do in
ordinary tort cases is punish the wrongdoer.
If compensation does not make the victim whole and does not
punish the wrongdoer, what is left? One suggestion, as the quoted
26. McDougald v. Garber, 536 N.E.2d 372, 374-75 (N.Y. 1989) (citing Skelton v.
Collins, 115 C.L.R. 94, 130 (Austl. 1966)).
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passage suggests, is that money can provide solace for the victim.
In a well-known article that marks the beginning of the contempo-
rary debate about damages for pain and suffering, Louis Jaffe
suggests that "though money is not an equivalent it may be a
consolation, a solatium."'27 Yet the notion of solace, by itself,
does not provide very strong support for a practice of compensa-
tion. It does not seem satisfactory from the point of view of cor-
rective justice, since it does not seem to "right the wrong." And it
causes problems for justifying any payment at all in cases where
the victim is in no condition to find any solace in money because
she is dead or permanently comatose.
In fact, when incommensurability is assumed, there is a prob-
lem with payment on account of injuries to dead or comatose
victims whatever the rationale for damages. In a case where fungi-
ble property is wrongfully taken or destroyed, where money dam-
ages can presumably make the victim whole, it is easy to under-
stand the victim's rights to compensation not to depend at all on
the victim's ability to receive it consciously; and it is easy to un-
derstand her compensation rights to pass to her successors just as
the equivalent property rights would have. By contrast, if we do
not conceive of bodily integrity as a property right-if we do not
conceive of it in market rhetoric-it becomes harder to understand
why the victim would have any rights to compensation unless she
were conscious of suffering, and harder to understand why her
compensation rights might inure to her surviving relatives.
Can my right to be free of pain and suffering be transgressed
if I am rendered permanently unaware of pain? If not, it appears
no damages should be paid to me. Is my right to be free of pain
and suffering a "thing" I can will to my children? If not, it ap-
pears my surviving children should not be paid damages on ac-
count of my suffering. They might, of course, be paid on account
of their own emotional distress.' They are in a condition to re-
27. Louis L. Jaffe, Damages for Personal Injury: The Impact of Insurance, 18 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 219, 224 (1953).
28. The courts traditionally were reluctant to grant recovery for such distress. See,
e.g., Borer v. American Airlines, Inc., 563 P.2d 858 (Cal. 1977) (holding that children
have no nonstatutory cause of action in negligence for loss of parental consortium). But
see, e.g., Weitl v. Moes, 311 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1981) (holding that a minor has an inde-
pendent cause of action for loss of the society and companionship of a parent who is
tortiously injured by a third party so as to cause a significant disruption or diminution of
the parent-child relationship); David J. Leibson, Recovery of Damages for Emotional
Distress for Physical Injury to Another, 15 J. FAM. L. 163 (1977) (criticizing judicial re-
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ceive solace; but what sense does it make to pay them money in-
tended to give me solace? Given incommensurability, solace is not
a commodity. Solace is not transferable or inheritable like proper-
ty.
These types of concerns may be reflected in traditional legal
requirements that the victim be conscious of suffering,29 and, in
death cases, that no payment is available for death itself.' These
types of concerns also may be reflected in varying legal responses
to the issue of payments to survivors on account of the victim's
suffering, as well as on account of their own suffering because of
the victim's death.31 Possibly the traditional limitations on recov-
ery for pain and suffering in these situations reflected recognition
of incommensurability.
Given incommensurability between injuries and dollars, anoth-
er of Jaffe's suggestions about what compensatory damages might
mean in the context of pain and suffering seems promising. He
suggests that "one who has suffered a violation of his bodily integ-
rity may feel a sense of continuing outrage," and that the payment
of money may somewhat "wipe out" this sense of outrage. 32 Pay-
ment of money might succeed in mitigating the sense of outrage
because it might make the victim feel that society really values her
personality and bodily integrity. "[B]ecause our society sets a high
value on money," Jaffe says, it can use "money or price as a
means of recognizing the worth of non-economic as well as eco-
luctance to award emotional distress damages in instances of injury to another).
29. See MARILYN MINZER ET AL, DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 4.21[3] (1989)
(citing cases).
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 925 (1979); David W. Leebron, Final
Moments: Damages for Pain and Suffering Prior to Death, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 256, 260,
278 n.92 (1989).
31. Tort recoveries in cases of the victim's death are governed by statute because at
early common law an action did not survive the death of the plaintiff. Survival statutes
allow the decedent's survivors t6 recover any damages the decedent could have recov-
ered, including damages for her own conscious pain and suffering prior to death, but not
damages for her own death; wrongful death statutes allow surviving relatives to recover
on account of the death itself. See Fitzgerald v. Hale, 78 N.W.2d 509, 514 (Iowa 1956);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 925-926 (1979). Wrongful death statutes tradi-
tionally limited recovery to pecuniary damages associated with the loss, excluding such
items as loss of the decedent's companionship, but many states now permit recovery for
nonpecuniary loss, especially parents' loss of a child's companionship, and some courts
interpret traditional statutes broadly to get a similar result. See, e.g., Green v. Bittner,
424 A.2d 210 (NJ. 1980).
32. Jaffe, supra note 27, at 224.
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nomic goods., 33 Payment of money "will signify [society's] sinceri-
ty."' This formulation is similar to the conception of redress to
which I earlier correlated a core noncommodified conception of
compensation. 5
Jaffe's suggestion resonates with the noncommodified concep-
tion of compensation because it attributes a plausible meaning to
compensation other than punishment or quid pro quo: recognizing
the wrong and signifying its weightiness. Weightiness is signified by
using something of great importance in our society-money. It
need not be of overwhelming significance that this thing, money, is
unrelated to the harm suffered, although exactly what the signifi-
cance of that unrelatedness is remains to be investigated. The
claim is that money may serve as a form of redress, though not
rectification, because of its importance in our culture. Moreover,
when the wrongdoer is a business entity, as is often the case, mon-
ey is the only thing important to it, and thus the only significant
thing it can yield up. Money is the only thing it can give to a
person in recognition of the wrong for which it is responsible.
In spite of his suggested rationale, Jaffe finds the case for
damages for pain and suffering to be uneasy. In a consequentialist
move that I think is empirically doubtful, he suggests that damages
for past pain might not be appropriate because past pain is unlike-
ly to be causing present outrage; presumably, therefore, payment is
not needed to relieve outrage. He also is troubled by the very
intractability--one might say the very incommensurability!-of
incommensurability, which he thinks counts as a reason not to pay
anything: "And even granting these arguments there must be set
over against them the arbitrary indeterminateness of the evalua-
tion." He also thinks that, leaving aside insurance, "do[ing] hon-
or to plaintiff's pain" might be an injustice in light of the "real
economic loss" to the negligent defendant; and that, considering
insurance, "it is doubtful that the pooled social fund of saving
should be charged with sums of indeterminate amount when com-
pensation performs no specific economic function., 37
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See supra Section I(B).
36. Jaffe, supra note 27, at 224.
37. Id. at 225.
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We see here the germ of an argument that the mere fact of
incommensurability means we should not pay. To Jaffe, the twin
earmarks of incommensurability-"indeterminacy" and "no specific
economic function"-are enough to render the case for compensa-
tion very dubious. By finding the earmarks of incommensurability
to be reason enough that no payment should be made, Jaffe's
argument denies the significance of incommensurability. Indeed, by
treating "honor to plaintiff's pain" as capable of being outweighed
by defendant's economic loss, the argument ambivalently rein-
scribes commensurability. In a sense, Jaffe faithfully tracks the
traditional legal position, even as far as encapsulating its ambiva-
lence.
B. Economic Analysis and the Torts "Crisis"
Some of Jaffe's contemporary successors are pressing these
arguments against compensation for pain and suffering ever more
forcefully. In order to understand the vehemence of these contem-
porary arguments, it is necessary to switch to realpolitik. The
backdrop of these debates is a "crisis" in tort liability, in which
there have been persistent perceptions that juries are awarding
"too much" to injured plaintiffs. Insurers and their sympathizers,
doctors and their sympathizers, product manufacturers and their
sympathizers--all agree that damage awards are too high. Only
plaintiffs' attorneys contend otherwise. Compensation for pain and
suffering becomes a focal point, because it is claimed that allQwing
it gives juries too much discretion to implement their sympathies
with injured plaintiffs at the expense of (what the defense advo-
cates fear that jurors perceive as) corporate deep pockets.
Incommensurability gives defendants and insurers an argumen-
tative handle. They say that damages for pain and suffering are
indeterminate, that there is no way to evaluate their appropriate-
ness, that there is no serious check on the jury's discretion. Many,
like Jaffe, have the intuition that the mere fact of indeterminate-
ness is an argument against compensation. Incommensurability is
evidently worth big bucks to defendants.
Moreover, there is an ironic way that incommensurability links
up the interests of defendants, especially insurers and product
manufacturers, with the theoretical view of certain economists. In
what has become a standard economic view, put forward in the
legal literature by Alan Schwartz, manufacturers of defective
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products should not have to pay those pain and suffering damages
that would not have been part of a rational bargain between the
manufacturer and the buyer of the product." That is, unless the
product buyer would have bargained and paid for insurance
against her own pain and suffering should an accident occur, it is
inefficient for tort law to insure her against her loss. I will call this
the optimal-insurance view.
The proponents of the optimal-insurance view argue theoreti-
cally that it is irrational to insure oneself against future losses of
this kind, because of the expected diminished value of one's
wealth in an injured state. The optimal-insurance view is part of a
larger economic worldview in which it is given that persons are
maximizers of dollars or utils, and rationality is maximization. Giv-
en the model's assumptions about how much people value their
dollars when they are healthy versus how much they value them
when they are impaired or in pain, a. rational calculus shows that
it is wealth- or welfare-maximizing not to insure. Thus, it would be
irrational to purchase insurance. Proponents of the optimal-insur-
ance view also argue empirically that people's rationality is borne
out by their failure to insure. They argue that because we do not
see separate insurance markets in which people insure themselves
against the risk of future pain and suffering (or loss of quality of
life, or loss of consortium, or intense emotional distress), we
should infer that people in fact are unwilling to insure themselves
against these losses. Because people are unwilling to insure them-
selves against these losses, the argument proceeds, we should as-
sume that the prices people pay for products do not include pay-
ment for implied warranties against such losses. The contract be-
tween consumer and manufacturer should be assumed not to in-
clude a bargained-for insurance provision, both because such a
provision would be theoretically irrational and because the absence
of actual insurance markets for pain and suffering counsels us not
to assume such a provision. In the absence of such a bargained-for
provision, the argument concludes, no damages should be available
for pain and suffering. It would be inefficient for the law to give
consumers something they themselves will not pay for.39
38. Se4 eg., Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical
Synthesis, 97 YA.E L. 353, 364-67, 408-11 (1988).
39. See id. at 413-15.
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But what precludes purchase of insurance may be not irratio-
nality but incommensurability. If it is empirically true that consum-
ers do not insure themselves against their own pain and suffering,
the best interpretation of their failure to insure may be not that
they are maximizing how much they value their money over differ-
ent possible states of their health, but rather that they are affirm-
ing the incommensurability between pain and suffering and dollars.
Perhaps the purchase of pain and suffering insurance would signify
to people that their own pain and suffering is a commodity re-
placeable with money. Perhaps people reject this conception of
their own pain and its connection to themselves. It may be that
when it comes to their own pain and suffering, people do not
conceive of themselves as wealth-maximizers. It may be that they
avoid conceiving of their own pain and suffering as commensura-
ble either with money or with other commodities that money
might buy. In other words, it may be that people reject the idea
of purchasing insurance because they reject the symbolism of the
transaction. They may reject the meaning it would have for their
selfhood.
The economic worldview of which the optimal-insurance argu-
ment is a part is a commodified conceptual scheme. Motivations
are conceived of in market rhetoric, rationality is conceived of as
maximizing profit or welfare, and justice is conceived of as effi-
ciency. Rationality thus conceived seems to imply an assump-
tion-a model-of widespread commensurability. The economic
worldview does not recommend that we determine empirically
whether people really do conceive of rationality and justice in
market rhetoric, and whether people really do understand values
as widely commensurable. As a theoretical model, it is not put
forward to track people's conventional understandings. As its ad-
herents make clear, its value as a theoretical model is supposed to
lie in its explanatory and predictive force, not in the extent to
which it tracks cultural or individual self-understandings about the
meaning of transactions.' Proponents of the economic worldview
cannot consistently hold that the model's general assumption of
40. That is why economic efficiency can be confidently put forward to explain cul-
tures that have never heard of efficient market exchange. See Edmund W. Kitch, The
Intellectual Foundations of "Law and Economics," 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 184, 187-88, 191
(1983).
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commensurability can be disconfirmed if we discover that in prac-
tice people accept incommensurability.
Yet the optimal-insurance view on compensation for pain and
suffering seems to want it both ways. The view stops short of
supposing that people's valuation of their own bodily integrity or
freedom from pain should simply be understood on its general
theoretical economic market model; instead, the view tells us that
here we look and see what people's conventional understanding is,
by observing whether insurance is purchased, and here we attach
importance to that conventional understanding. The agreement
asks us to attach importance to conventional self-understandings
just at the point where incommensurability gets in the way of
damage recovery, but no further-not enough to look for wide-
spread incommensurabilty, which, if its significance were similarly
treated, could undermine the overall theoretical assumptions of
economic analysis.
One way to correct the inconsistency would be forthrightly to
assimilate pain and suffering to the market model. That is, in an
economic analysis that postulates that all things people value are
goods with prices, one could bite the bullet and postulate as well
that bodily integrity and freedom from pain are also goods with
prices. This is a view I often call universal commodification; we
might also call it simple reductionism.
In simple reductionism, bodily integrity is just one more good
that people value, and every value is reducible to dollars. Since
people are assumed to value their bodily integrity directly in dol-
lars, when injured they can be made whole by paying them the
appropriate number of dollars. Thus, simple reductionism leads
easily to the core commodified conception of compensation, re-
flecting the reductionist claim of commensurability. In fact, for
simple reductionists the next step would be for the'law to admit
that pain and suffering is simply another kind of economic loss.4
41. See, eg., Randall R Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort. Scheduling
"Pain and Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. REv. 908, 913, 927-28 (1989).
[R]ecent empirical research forcefully concludes that intangible harms like the
loss of enjoyment of life are economic losses, and proponents apply a disarm-
ingly straightforward calculus to compute the monetary value of such loss-
es ....
Evidence on the "value of life" comes from accumulating findings about
how people value risks of injury and death, both on the job and at home ....
The most obvious application of this expertise is in lawsuits for wrongful death
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An economic argument about compensation for pain and
suffering that is often put forward in opposition to the optimal-
insurance view may rely on simple reductionism. The argument
claims that consumers are willing to pay to avoid pain and suffer-
ing, even if they do not insure against it. In such an economic
view, the implicit contract between manufacturer and consumer
should be understood to include, at the appropriate price, compen-
sation for such harms, in order to achieve optimal precautions
against accidents. I will call this the optimal-precautions view.
Thus, Judge Richard Posner opines,
We disagree with those students of tort law who believe that
pain and suffering are not real costs and should not be allowable
items of damages in a tort suit. No one likes pain and suffering
and most people would pay a good deal of money to be free of
them. If they were not recoverable in damages, the cost of neg-
ligence would be less to the tortfeasors and there would be more
negligence, more accidents, more pain and suffering, and hence
higher social costs.42
The optimal-precautions view is embedded in a deterrence view of
torts in general, in which the purpose of paying damages is to
deter accidents that would otherwise cost more.
Judge Posner may be a simple reductionist. Although he does
not flatly say that injuries reduce to dollars, he does say that pain
and suffering are "real costs." In any case, as we can see from his
remark, he assumes commensurability between the cost of paying
damages (dollars) and those other social costs (pain and suffering)
if the dollars are not paid. This is the crux of the optimal-precau-
tions view; it must assume that we can tell which costs are "high-
er." Thus, although the optimal-precautions view need not ex-
plicitly reduce injuries to dollars, it is committed to the possibility
of ranking injuries on a scale with dollars so that we can deter-
mine at what point the dollars are equal to or greater than the
value of not being injured. 43 This view reflects at least the scalar
and survival actions, but it would also be relevant to pain and suffering, loss of
pleasure of life, and other new notions of intangible loss in personal injury
cases. These losses would be newly supportable as "economic" elements of loss,
and would have corresponding and specific dollar values, not merely vague ver-
bal descriptions.
Id.
42. Kwasny v. United, States, 823 F.2d 194, 197 (7th Cir. 1987).
43. Presumably this value would be measured by observing what people are willing
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claim of commensurability, if not the reductionist claim. It arrives
at the conclusion that damages for pain and suffering ought to be
paid, but does so by committing itself to a commodified concep-
tion of compensation.
C. A Reform Proposal
Another way to deal with the apparent inconsistency in the
economic optimal-insurance argument is to investigate in a much
broader way what our actual understandings of compensation are.
What would such an investigation reveal? We could take our un-
derstanding to be the somewhat ambiguous traditional conception,
reflected in the passage from the Restatement quoted above, that
compensation for pain and suffering provides redress in some way
other than by making freedom from injury commensurable with
money. We could recognize that corrective justice is at least an
important basis for tort law, and try to develop a view of correc-
tive justice that does not require the rectification that incommen-
surability precludes.
We could also take it to be the case, as I suggest, that there
is no one understanding of compensation that is "ours." The
Restatement's ambivalence may faithfully mirror conflict. Intuitions
are divided about commensurability, and so are intuitions about
what compensation means. Our practice of compensation is con-
flicted; commodified and noncommodified understandings coexist.
What should we make of the conflict, practically speaking?
One suggestion for alleviating the "crisis" in tort liability
seems to advise us to ignore it. We should bypass conflicting theo-
ries of tort and compensation prevalent in legal rhetoric and look
more systematically at the bottom line in practice. How much
money is being paid for what? Two recurrent complaints about
awards for pain and suffering are' that they are indeterminate,
causing perceptions of unfairness and causing deterrence theory
not to work, and that they leave it open to juries to give plaintiffs
the moon. The suggestion is that both worries can be alleviated by
compiling extensive data on awards in specific categories of cases
and requiring future awards presumptively to adhere to a schedule
to pay to avoid being injured. See W. Kip Viscusi, FATAL TRADEoFFs: PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK (1992).
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based on this data.' Outliers will be prevented, or at least juries
will have to justify them.
I am sympathetic with the pragmatic methodology that would
counsel us to work around our conflicts by closer attention to
concrete practice, rather than attempt to resolve them a priori in
theory. At first glance, therefore, the suggestion that the tort "cri-
sis" can be alleviated by legislating schedules based upon past
awards seems promising.' Yet I think it is especially important
for a pragmatic approach to try to find out how much incommen-
surability actually exists and whether we need it for anything im-
portant. I believe it is important not to beg the question whether
people have significant commitments to incommensurability, and if
so, whether such commitments are important to human flourishing.
It seems to me that the suggestion that we legislate schedules
based upon past awards does risk begging this question by assum-
ing a species of commensurability. I think this tendency to assume
commensurability can be seen in the way these reformers approach
the issue of how the law should delineate the specific categories in
which damage awards should be made comparable. One suggestion
is that severity of injury and age of the injured party are the main
relevant factors, with the implication that severity of injury is
something that can at least be roughly scaled or placed in catego-
ries ranging from least to most severe.' By linking such a scale
to ranges of dollar amounts, this approach asks the law to institu-
tionalize a scalar version of commensurability, though not one that
is outright reductionist in equating freedom from injury with dol-
lars.
One group of researchers finds a scale of severity used by
insurers to evaluate malpractice cases to be useful. I reproduce it
in a footnote to show both the intuitive appeal of such a scale,
that we do conventionally recognize that some injuries are worse
44. See James F. Blumstein et al., Beyond Tort Reform: Developing Better Tools for
Assessing Damages for Personal Injury, 8 YALE J. ON REG. 171 (1991); Bovbjerg et al.,
supra note 41; Frederick S. Levin, Pain and Suffering Guidelines: A Cure for Damages
Measurement "Anomie," 22 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 303 (1989).
45. Of course, it is necessary to face the serious problem of determining the circum-
stances under which it would be just simply to force future awards to follow the patterns
of the past. For example, in the past, pain and suffering from medical malpractice has
seemed to be "worth" more than pain and suffering from auto accidents. Should this
pattern be made into a rule, or does it instead require correction? See Bovbjerg et al.,
supra note 41, at 943 n.166.
46. Id. at 938-42.
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than others, and how problematic are attempts to formalize that
intuition.47 Another researcher simply lists eighteen types of in-
jury' and sets out data showing how the legal system has com-
pensated for them. According to his research, cancer and burn vic-
tims are most likely to receive some award for pain and suffering,
and people who suffer paraplegia, quadriplegia, or brain damage
are likely to receive the largest pain and suffering awards.49 As-
suming this research is valid, what should we do with it? The re-
searchers advocate, in essence, that the law should adopt a species
of commensurability by enacting a schedule that makes these
trends into legal rules.
47. The National Association of Insurance Commissioners set forth this 9-point scale:
Severity of Injury Scale Examples
1. Emotional only Fright, no physical damage.
2. Temporary insignificant Lacerations, contusions, minor scars, rash.
No deldy.
3. Temporary minor Infections, misset fracture, fall in hospital.
Recovery delayed.
4. Temporary major Bums, surgical material left, drug side-effect,
brain damage. Recovery delayed.
5. Permanent minor Loss of fingers, loss or damage to organs.
Include non-disabling injuries.
6. Permanent significant Deafness, loss of limb, loss of eye, loss of
one kidney or lung.
7. Permanent major Paraplegia, blindness, loss of two limbs,
I brain damage.
8. Permanent grave Quadraplegia, severe brain damage, lifelong
care or fatal prognosis.
9. Death
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: FINAL
COMPILATION 10 (M. Patricia Sowka ed., 1980). Bovbjerg, Sloan, and Blumstein think this
scale would be useful in preparing an appropriate damages schedule, and they claim that
severity of injury, measured by this scale, accounts for two-fifths of the variance in re-
ported damage awards. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 41, at 923. They find the categories
"intuitively appealing," with the possible exception of the "emotional only" category,
which encompasses too wide a range. For example, surely there are emotional injuries
that are worse than lacerations and contusions. Id. at 920. Others might find the death
category just as debatable; some things are worse than death.
Even if the scale strikes us as intuitively capturing a rough sense of increasing
severity of injury, why should we assume that pain and suffering vary linearly with the
severity of the injury? On the contrary, death, and possibly "severe brain damage," brings
an end to suffering.
48. See W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Product Liability Cases: Systematic
Compensation or Capricious Awards? 8 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 203, 207 (1988) (listing
amputation, asphyxiation, brain damage, bruise, burn, cancer, concussion, dermatitis, dis-
location, disease-other, electrical shock, fracture, laceration, para/quadriplegia, poison, re-
spiratory, sprain/strain, and other).
49. Id. at 207-08.
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Whether we should declare a species of commensurability in
this way is unclear. If we think incommensurability is an important
commitment in self-constitution and in life as we know it, then
before enacting such legal rules we at least would like to know
whether the law itself has any effect on the existence of incom-
mensurability. How deep and how extensive are people's 'commit-
ments to incommensurability? If the law does declare commensur-
ability, will it cause people's commitment to incommensurability to
fade?
This question is very important, both theoretically and practi-
cally, but I must say that, right now, I do not know how to ap-
proach trying to answer it. I offer tentative thoughts below, invit-
ing others to tackle the problem.
IV. COMPENSATION PRACTICE AND THE CULTURE-SHAPING
FUNCTION OF LAW
Can legal rules in fact bring about commensurability? Is the
existence of incommensurability something that can vary depending
upon the state of the legal system? The answer is yes, if (1)
incommensurability is part of the conventional cultural system of
meaning (our form of life), and if (2) the state of the legal system
affects that system of meaning. With respect to (1), I am inclined
to agree with Joseph Raz that incommensurability is an artifact of
our shared discourse. (What else could it be?) With respect to (2),
I am also inclined to think that the law matters for that shared
discourse. But the details of how it matters are not easy to specify.
In a view that I find attractive, law not only reflects culture,
but also shapes it. The law is a powerful conceptual-rhetorical,
discursive-force. It expresses conventional understandings of val-
ue, and at the same time influences conventional understandings of
value. Yet mere recognition of this two-way street is too general
to be useful. It is not easy to say when we should view the law as
predominantly reflecting background culture and when we should
view the law as a moving force in changing that culture. Neverthe-
less, it seems in general that, at least sometimes, the law can be a
cultural moving force. If this is a useful way to see the function of
law, and I think it is, then the law may indeed influence how we
understand ourselves and our values, and, in particular, whether
we understand certain aspects of ourselves, such as bodily integrity
and freedom from pain, to be incommensurable with money.
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I have said that our conventional understanding of what com-
pensation means is conflicted, that compensation is a contested
concept. Suppose, however, that someone believes that because we
inhabit a market society, the main meaning of paying money for
injuries is that money and injuries are exchangeable commodities.
The observer might believe that our compensation practice directly
reflects a commodified conception of compensation; we really are
saying that injuries are reducible to dollars or can be placed on a
scale with dollars. Or, more subtly, the observer might believe that
even if our compensation practice is primarily meant, as traditional
legal discourse would have it, not to equate injuries and dollars,
but rather to provide a different sort of redress, nevertheless, since
the practice is located in a market society, the practice will come
to be interpreted as commodification and indeed will create
commodification. That is, when we live in a world in which many
or most things people need and want are routinely traded as com-
modities, and when we see dollars systematically being paid to
people after they are injured, and in some way "for" or "on ac-
count of" the injury, we are likely to come to conceive of freedom
from injury as another commodity bearing exchange value, even if
we do not now conceive of it that way. If such an observer holds
that conceiving of bodily integrity and freedom from pain as com-
modities leads to a degradation of personhood and an inferior
conception of human flourishing, then he may argue that compen-
sation for pain and suffering should be abolished.
This is one way to read the arguments of Richard Abel,"
who advocates a social insurance scheme. He would replace the
tort system with one that grants money to people regardless of
whether their misfortunes are caused by their own fault, other
people's fault, an unavoidable accident, an illness, or a congenital
disability. Abel's ideal system would not compensate for pain and
suffering; such damages "commodify our unique experience."51
Nor would it compensate for loss of consortium or witnessing
injury to a loved one; such damages "commodif[y] love." 2 In
saying that damages operate to "commodify," Abel implies either
50. See, eg., Richard Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785, 804-06
(1990) Politics makes strange bedfellows. Revolutionary anticommodifiers may lie down
with the economic allies of corporate defendants. See id. at 831.
51. Id. at 804.
52. Id. at 805.
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that our shared understanding of compensation is a commodified
conception, or that the practice of payment, in our market social
context, can make it so.
Another observer of our discursive practice of compensation
might not be so ready to think that the commodified conception
prevails, or will come to prevail.53 Perhaps, even though market
rhetoric is an important conceptual scheme in our culture, and
even though we are influenced in our conceptualization of com-
pensation by a legal system that pays people dollars in a context
that expresses that the payment is "for" the injury, we can still
maintain a noncommodified conception of compensation. Perhaps
the noncommodified conception is robust; perhaps incommen-
surability is robust.
I can restate the issue this way. If we do conceive of compen-
sation in primarily a noncommodified way-if we are clear that it
is not a quid pro quo, but rather a symbolic action that reinforces
our commitments about rights and wrongs-then the practice of
paying compensation does not signify that we conceive of the
harms to persons for which we pay it as commodities. Yet one
who values noncommodified understandings of human attributes,
quality of life, and bodily integrity might still fear that the
noncommodified conception of compensation is in danger of giving
way sooner or later to the commodified conception, under the on-
slaught of constant payment "for" injuries in the context of a
culture that readily understands analogous interactions as market
exchanges, perhaps helped along by the rhetoric of economic anal-
ysis. How should we evaluate this fear? How robust is the
noncommodified conception?
One thing we can do is look and see how prevalent the
noncommodified conception is in legal discourse, and try to evalu-
ate whether it is becoming weaker or more questionable. The
investigation could pursue a "thick description" of arguments in
tort cases, jury instructions, and trial and appellate court opinions.
My supposition is that this investigation would show that the tradi-
tional noncommodified conception, albeit ambiguous and conflict-
53. If the observer is a proponent of a comprehensive social insurance scheme, she
still might hold that no payments should be made on account of pain and suffering, not
primarily because the payments express or foster commodification, but rather because
such payments will need to be foregone if there is to be enough money to go around to -
satisfy everyone's basic needs. See, eg., SUGARMAN, supra note 5, at 36-38.
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ed, is holding firm. Or the investigation could pursue an analysis
of the rhetoric of tort scholarship. My supposition is that this
investigation would show that the commodified conception is gain-
ing ground.
We also could try to evaluate just how deeply entrenched our
intuitions of incommensurability are, for those of us who have
them, though I do not know how such an investigation would
proceed. Perhaps understandings involving incommensurability are
so deeply entrenched that no amount of market rhetoric can dis-
lodge them or the conceptions of human values they underwrite. If
this is how things are, then commodified and noncommodified
conceptions will simply continue to coexist as they do now, and
they will pretty well track people's commitments about incommen-
surability. People who accept incommensurability will tend to have
a noncommodified conception of compensation, and people who
do not accept incommensurability will tend to have a commodified
conception of compensation. On the other hand, perhaps our intu-
itions of incommensurability will turn out to be more frag-
ile-perhaps the conventional discursive system that underwrites
them will turn out to be more malleable-in which case incom-
mensurability may tend to disappear under the continued influence
of surrounding market discourse and practice.
V. CONCLUSION
At least in the context" of damages for personal injury, com-
pensation is a contested concept. Noncommodified conceptions are
committed to incommensurability. Commodified conceptions are
committed to commensurability. These conflicting conceptions
coexist within our legal practice and discourse. Once we recognize
the conflict, we can gain better insight into the debate about com-
pensation for pain and suffering. We can also understand the im-
portance of incommensurability for thinking about corrective jus-
tice in general. For now, though, it remains unclear how we should
evaluate the effect of the law's own symbolic force in maintaining
the existence of incommensurability.
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